Does Competition Favor Delegation? by Christian Alejandro Ruzzier
 
Copyright © 2009 by Christian A. Ruzzier 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Does Competition Favor 
Delegation?  
 












1This paper is adapted from Chapter 2 of the author￿ s Ph.D. dissertation at the Toulouse School
of Economics. I want to thank my supervisor, Jacques CrØmer, as well as Guido Friebel for great
advice and support. For many useful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Philippe Aghion,
Ricardo Alonso, Emmanuelle Auriol, Nick Bloom, Catherine Casamatta, Jean-Etienne de Bet-
tignies, Mikhail Drugov, Robert Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Patrick Herbst, Kieron Meagher, Michael
Powell, David Thesmar, Andrew Wait, and seminar participants at Harvard, MIT, IAE Business
School, the 7th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, and the 3rd Organiza-
tional Economics Workshop of the University of Sydney. Responsibility for errors is my own. A
previous version of this paper circulated under the title "Delegation of Authority in Oligopoly".
2Address: 25 Harvard Way, Baker Library j Bloomberg Center 444B, Boston, MA 02163. Phone:
+1 (617) 495 0875. E-mail: cruzzier@hbs.edu.Abstract
This paper studies the consequences of product-market competition on ￿rms￿decisions to
delegate more or fewer decision-making responsibilities to managers. By simultaneously
addressing the choice of both competitive actions and organizational design, the paper makes
an attempt at bringing economic theory and management strategy closer together.
An increase in substitutability between the products of the di⁄erent ￿rms triggers a
di⁄erent response depending on the size of the ￿rm: larger ￿rms delegate more responsibility,
whereas smaller ￿rms centralize decision making. The increase in substitutability also causes
some ￿rms to exit the market, which pushes in the direction of reduced managerial autonomy.
Stronger competition also leads to less discretion in markets in which the possibilities for
product di⁄erentiation are important.
For a given number of ￿rms, an increase in market size increases centralization, as the
owner of the ￿rm ￿nds it more costly to accept rent seeking by the managers. However, this
increase in market size will lead to the entry of more ￿rms, which calls for more decentralized
decision making. Under reasonable conditions, the aggregate e⁄ect leads to a U-shaped
relationship where ￿rms in both small and large markets are characterized by high levels of
discretion, while there is less discretion for intermediate market sizes. Finally, a reduction
in entry barriers leads unambiguously to an increase in the level of discretion given to the
agent, as it results in a larger number of ￿rms entering the market and, for a given market
size, in lower concentration or expected ￿rm-level demand, which reduces the value of having
control and pushes in the direction of increased autonomy.
JEL Codes: D43, L13, L22, M21
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As simple as the question ￿ Does competition favor delegation?￿may appear, its answer proves
elusive. It seems fair to say that most economists would be inclined to answer a¢ rmatively.
However, it is not hard to ￿nd anecdotal evidence to the contrary ￿see, for instance, the case
of Jacobs Suchard as depicted in Holland (1989). It is also simple to argue for a negative
relationship between product-market competition and delegation on theoretical grounds ￿
for example, if competition calls for tighter coordination or makes it easier for principals to
learn from other ￿rms, an increase in competition should lead to less delegation.
Turning to the empirical evidence for an answer can also be frustrating: Although there
is much informal discussion about how increasing competition is driving corporate change,
empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and delegation does not abound
￿and is far from conclusive. Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2009) document
a positive correlation between competition and delegation. Caroli and van Reenen (2001),
however, ￿nd basically no evidence of a relationship between competition and organizational
change (as characterized by delegation of responsibility and delayering). Khandwalla (1973)
also ￿nds no correlation between delegation and price competition, and between delegation
and overall competition, but documents a positive correlation between delegation and prod-
uct competition (di⁄erentiation).1 Marin and Verdier (2008a), on the other hand, report
evidence from Germany and Austria that ￿rms are more likely to centralize decision-making
powers when competition strengthens. More indirectly, Nickell et al. (2001) show that poor
performance leads ￿rms to centralize decision making, and Karuna (2008) ￿nds evidence
suggesting that stronger competition is related to stronger corporate governance (which can
be interpreted as reduced autonomy).
In this paper, I try to throw some light on the circumstances under which stronger
product-market competition leads ￿rms to either increase or reduce delegation. It is also
an aim of the paper to suggest new directions for further empirical research by pointing to
1This work underlines the importance of clarifying the type of competition ￿rms are facing when analyzing
the e⁄ect of competition on delegation practices ￿see below.
1interactions and nonlinearities that seem to have been previously overlooked, and also by
spelling out the sources of increased competition.
To address these concerns, I develop an oligopoly model of horizontal product di⁄eren-
tiation ￿ la Salop (1979), in which each ￿rm is composed of a principal and an agent. The
principal has a claim on her ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow and makes all entry, personnel, and pricing
decisions, but can decide to grant discretion over the choice of a cost-reducing project to
an agent she hires to carry out production. With each project is associated a given cost
reduction, and also a private bene￿t for the agent. There is a con￿ ict of interests between
the principal and the agent to the extent that the latter may use his discretion to pursue
objectives other than pro￿t maximization. After a project is implemented, each ￿rm learns
the realization of its own marginal cost, which is not observed by its rivals. Firms then
compete in prices.
Ex ante all cost-reducing projects look alike, but the parties can tell them apart through
further investigation. Each principal must decide the level of discretion to be granted to
her agent (or, conversely, the amount of control she wants to retain), which will in turn
induce him to collect information or not about feasible projects. More control means the
principal￿ s preferred option will be selected and implemented more often. Control, however,
has costs, both explicit and implicit. An agent who is likely to be overruled by his principal
is less willing to exert e⁄ort to gather information on projects. If this e⁄ort adds value to
the ￿rm, an implicit cost of control arises due to reduced initiative on the part of the agent.
But control has also explicit costs brought about by the implementation of a management
control system, the choice of a monitoring technology, or simply the collection of information
about projects. Competition a⁄ects this trade-o⁄, thereby calling for modi￿cations to the
￿rm￿ s delegation choices.
Increased competition may arise from di⁄erent sources: an increase in market size or
in product substitutability, and a reduction in entry costs. The predicted impact of in-
creased competition on the agent￿ s autonomy depends crucially on what triggers the change
in competition.
2For a given number of ￿rms, an increase in substitutability between the products of
the di⁄erent ￿rms has two opposite e⁄ects on the gain from reducing costs: a business-
stealing e⁄ect (for given prices of rivals, it becomes easier to steal business from them by
reducing costs and prices) and a strategic e⁄ect (an increase in substitutability leads to lower
equilibrium prices and a loss of market share, which decreases a ￿rm￿ s gain from reducing
its costs). When the strategic e⁄ect dominates, the optimal response of the principal is
to increase autonomy in order to commit to higher expected costs, and thus higher prices.
Given that the strategic e⁄ect is proportional to market concentration (or expected ￿rm
output), this e⁄ect is more likely to overcome the business-stealing e⁄ect for ￿rms in more
concentrated markets. A straightforward implication of this result is that larger ￿rms react
di⁄erently than smaller ￿rms when faced with the same environmental change: the former
delegate more responsibility, whereas the latter centralize decision making.
With an endogenous number of ￿rms, a third e⁄ect appears through the change in the
equilibrium number of ￿rms. An increase in substitutability causes some ￿rms to exit the
market, making this third e⁄ect negative and reinforcing the business-stealing e⁄ect, thus
making it less likely to have a positive impact of increased competition on autonomy as
compared to the case with an exogenous number of ￿rms. I also show that an increase
in product substitutability leads principals to grant less autonomy in markets where the
possibilities for product di⁄erentiation are important.
An increase in market size with a ￿xed number of ￿rms increases the cost of the loss of
control brought about by delegation and the value of a cost reduction, and thus calls for a
higher level of control ￿or reduced autonomy. With an endogenous market structure, how-
ever, market size also a⁄ects the optimal level of discretion indirectly through the equilibrium
number of ￿rms: more ￿rms are attracted to the market, which tends to reduce the gain
from a cost reduction, and calls for more decentralized decision making. Therefore, the total
e⁄ect cannot be signed a priori. Under reasonable conditions on the sensitivity of the num-
ber of ￿rms to changes in market size, the model predicts a U-shaped relationship between
competition and delegation: decentralized decision-making structures are more common in
3￿rms in very small and very large markets.
Finally, a reduction in entry barriers leads unambiguously to an increase in the level of
discretion given to the agent, as it results in a larger number of ￿rms entering the market
and, for a given market size, in lower concentration or expected ￿rm-level demand, which
reduces the costs of losing control and pushes in the direction of increased autonomy.
To the best of my knowledge, Alonso et al. (2008), De Bijl (1995), Marin and Verdier
(2008a, b), Meagher and Wang (2009), and Ruzzier (2009) are the only papers in the litera-
ture that deal with the interaction between product-market competition and delegation. The
modeling of the delegation problem in Marin and Verdier is similar to mine, but their focus is
on the delegation of formal authority and the e⁄ects of increased international competition.
Meagher and Wang, and Alonso et al. focus on di⁄erent trade-o⁄s: the former analyze the
virtues of decentralization in a dynamic real-time information processing model in which
delay in information processing is important, whereas the latter investigate how market con-
ditions a⁄ect the trade-o⁄ between coordination and adaptation in a multi-market ￿rm. In
my previous work, I examine the impact of exogenous changes in competition on managerial
autonomy in a context in which the agent a⁄ects not only expected pro￿ts but also their
riskiness. The work of De Bijl adopts a complementary approach, focusing on the strategic
impact of organizational design on market competition. The present paper is close to Raith
(2003) in some respects, although Raith analyzes a di⁄erent organizational problem ￿that
of choosing the power of incentives provided to the agent.
The next section presents the model in detail. In Section 3 I solve for the equilibrium.
Section 4 is the central part of the paper; I discuss the impact of changes in product-market
competition on the delegation decisions of ￿rms. I begin with the case with an exogenous
number of ￿rms and then turn to a situation of endogenous market structure. Section 5
concludes.
42 The model
2.1 The industry and the market
Consider a monopolistically competitive industry with di⁄erentiated brands, composed of a
large number of identical potential ￿rms. The product space is a circle with a perimeter
equal to one (Salop, 1979). n ￿rms (indexed by i = 1;:::;n) enter into this market and
choose symmetric locations ￿the distance between ￿rms is then 1
n. The cost of entry is f;
and there is free entry and exit.
Consumers are located uniformly around the circle with mass m: They have unit demands
and incur a unit transport cost t per unit of length. Each of them is willing to buy at the
smallest generalized price as long as it does not exceed the gross surplus s enjoyed when
consuming the good. I assume s is su¢ ciently large that all consumers buy ￿i.e., the market
is always covered.2 Formally:






cP is a (constant) marginal cost and will be de￿ned in the next subsection.
2.2 The organization of the ￿rm
Each ￿rm is composed of a risk-neutral principal-owner and an agent. The principal has
a claim on her ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow and holds all formal decision rights. She makes all entry,
personnel, and pricing decisions, but can delegate the choice of a cost-reducing project (see
below) to an agent she hires to carry out production; i.e., the principal-owner can grant the
agent some decision-making autonomy.3
2The generalized price when buying from ￿rm i for a consumer with coordinate x is pi + td, where d
denotes the distance from the consumer￿ s location to that of ￿rm i. Notice that transport costs are linear in
the distance. As usual, t could be interpreted as the utility loss consumers su⁄er from not consuming their
preferred variety.
3By owner, I mean someone with (expected) pro￿t maximization as a goal. It could be the actual owner,
or any manager who has been given incentives to maximize ￿rm pro￿ts (cf. Fershtman and Judd, 1987) or
5Projects Each ￿rm operates a constant marginal cost technology, where marginal cost is
given by
ci = c ￿ ￿i:
c > 0 is the marginal cost that results if no cost-reducing project is implemented, and ￿i is
the cost reduction brought about by a project implemented by ￿rm i (i.e., ￿i = c ￿ ci).
After entry, each ￿rm must choose between k ￿ 3 potential cost-reducing projects. With
each project is also associated a private bene￿t ￿i for the agent. Among the projects, there is
one that yields the maximum cost reduction
￿
￿P￿
, and is the principal￿ s preferred project;4
one that yields the highest private bene￿t (B), and is the agent￿ s preferred project; and at
least one that implies a su¢ ciently bad outcome for either party, such that picking a project
at random would not be pro￿table for any of them. If no project is implemented the cost
reduction and the private bene￿t are both equal to zero. The payo⁄s of the relevant projects
can be summarized as follows.
f￿i;￿ig =
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if no project is implemented
if the principal￿ s preferred project is implemented
if the agent￿ s preferred project is implemented
The principal￿ s preferred project yields marginal cost cP ￿ c ￿ ￿P; whereas the agent￿ s
preferred project yields cA ￿ c ￿ ￿A: We also de￿ne ￿c ￿ cA ￿ cP: To have a meaningful
delegation problem, I assume there is a con￿ ict of interests between the principal and the
agent.
ASSUMPTION 2: cP < cA < c and B > b > 0:
The idea here is that there is a loss of control stemming from the fact that the agent may
use his discretion to pursue objectives other than cost minimization ￿like enhancing his ca-
reer prospects, indulging in empire building, acquiring speci￿c human capital or professional
experience, and so on.
who can divert those pro￿ts to himself (as in Hart and Holmstrom, 2008).
4It is straightforward to show that pro￿ts are decreasing in the marginal cost ci. See equation (4) below.
6Contracts Ex ante all projects look alike, and cannot be distinguished without further
investigation.5 Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), I further assume that project choice,
though observable to an informed party, is not contractible.6 Therefore, compensation con-
tingent on project choice is not possible.
I focus on the case in which the formal decision right cannot be transferred to the agent.
Hence, the principal always keeps the formal authority over project selection.7 For simplicity,
and because the link between incentives and competition has already been extensively studied
(see Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Hermalin 1992, 1994; Martin, 1993; Horn et al., 1994,
1995; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; and Vives, 2008), I abstract from monetary incentives.8
The only feasible contracts between principal and agent in each ￿rm then specify a level
of discretion or autonomy, which is the probability 1 ￿ Ii of letting the agent select a cost-
reducing project, and a ￿ at wage wi ￿ 0.9 Ii 2 [0;1] summarizes the delegation decision of
principal i and represents accordingly the probability that she will impose a project choice.
This characterization of autonomy as freedom from in￿ uence ￿ts nicely with traditional
de￿nitions of managerial autonomy, such as Dill￿ s (1958), who judges an agent to be au-
5That is, the parties do not know ex ante which projects yield which payo⁄s.
6In other words, projects cannot be described ex ante and put into an enforceable contract, nor can their
implementation be veri￿ed ex post.
7As a practical matter, the principal normally keeps the right to overrule the agent, as she can always
￿re him.
8This extreme assumption is typical in models that study optimal delegation decisions (De Bijl, 1994;
Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Burkart et al., 1997; Ruzzier, 2009). A common feature in this kind of models is
that all their qualitative results typically go through when the agent responds to monetary incentives, as
long as he cares enough about his private bene￿ts. The existence and magnitude of these bene￿ts have been
extensively documented (see Zingales, 1995, and the references cited therein). They are also central in Hart
and Holmstrom￿ s (2008) theory of ￿rm scope.
9Private bene￿ts could be su¢ ciently large to render incentive contracts unpro￿table (as in Acemoglu
et al., 2007), the agent might be in￿nitely averse to income risk (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), the principal￿ s
pro￿ts could be nonveri￿able (Mello and Ruckes, 2006), or ￿xed wages may be due to union in￿ uence (De
Bijl, 1994). In any case, a ￿ at wage results. Leonard (1990) shows that actually ￿xed wages are the norm
for lower levels in the hierarchy. Assuming that the wage must always be positive is done for the sake of
simplicity, and is actually stronger than necessary.
7tonomous with respect to the principal ￿to the extent that he [...] [is] independent in for-
mulating tasks or in carrying through courses of action￿￿as well as with the more modern
notions of real authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and e⁄ective control rights (Burkart et
al., 1997).
2.3 Delegation decisions, information gathering and project choice
Each principal simultaneously chooses Ii 2 [0;1] at cost
I2
i
2 ; and communicates it to her
agent.10 This choice is unobservable to outsiders ￿that is, principals and agents in other
￿rms. I interpret Ii as a nonveri￿able information gathering e⁄ort: if principal i exerts e⁄ort
Ii; she learns all projects￿payo⁄s with probability Ii; and nothing with probability 1 ￿ Ii.11
No commitment problem arises regarding the choice of Ii; even if it were only an informal
promise, since without information a principal would not want to interfere with the agent￿ s
decision. 1 ￿ Ii then measures the extent of the agent￿ s discretion.
Ii could alternatively be interpreted literally as a probability of intervention or interfer-
ence in the agent￿ s operations determined by costly actions on the part of the principal,
like the implementation of a management control system (Merchant, 1998), the choice of a
monitoring technology (as in CrØmer, 1995) or an ownership structure (as in Burkart et al.,
1997), or any other organizational feature that does not change frequently and can act as a
credible commitment. For the sake of concreteness, I will follow the information gathering
interpretation in what follows.
Given his principal￿ s delegation decision, each agent chooses whether or not to collect
information (i.e., his decision variable is ei 2 f0;1g) on the payo⁄s of all available projects at
personal cost   > 0: His choice is not observable, and can be regarded as a noncontractible
￿rm-speci￿c investment (cf. Burkart et al., 1997).12
10Any increasing and convex cost-of-e⁄ort function would do ￿I have chosen this simple formulation to
obtain closed-form solutions.
11This information-acquisition technology is familiar from Aghion and Tirole (1997).
12Notice that there is no randomness in the agent￿ s information gathering, given his e⁄ort. This binary
formulation for the agent￿ s e⁄ort is chosen for tractability and because the main focus of the paper is on
8Since the principal holds the formal decision right, she will exercise it every time she is
informed, and her preferred project will be implemented. On the other hand, given that
choosing at random is not pro￿table, an uninformed principal will delegate project choice
to the agent ￿who then enjoys real authority or decision-making autonomy. In the case the
agent is also uninformed, both parties agree not to undertake any project. But if the agent
is informed, he chooses and implements his preferred project.
2.4 Price competition
After a project is implemented, each ￿rm learns the realization of its own marginal cost ci;
which is not observed by its rivals. Firms then compete in prices. The principal in each
￿rm is in charge of pricing decisions, which are taken simultaneously by all principals at this
stage. I assume that cP is such that a symmetric interior equilibrium obtains in the pricing
game ￿broadly speaking, it should not be much lower than c; to ensure that a ￿rm has only
two e⁄ective competitors: its two closest rivals. Formally, I make the following assumption.




f is the maximum equilibrium number of ￿rms, and is obtained from the zero
pro￿t condition
(s￿cP)m
n ￿ f = 0; where the ￿rst term on the left-hand side is each ￿rm￿ s
maximum expected pro￿t in a symmetric equilibrium. Assumption 3 ensures that it is not
pro￿table for ￿rm i to sell to customers located further from it than its immediate neighbors.
2.5 Timing
Summing up, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. All ￿rms make their entry decisions simultaneously.
2. All the principals simultaneously make their delegation decisions.
autonomy or discretion 1 ￿ I:
93. All the agents choose simultaneously whether or not to collect information.
4. Each ￿rm selects and implements a cost-reducing project.
5. Marginal costs are realized (each ￿rm observes only its own realization).
6. Firms compete in the product market by simultaneously choosing prices.
7. Consumers choose from which ￿rm to purchase and payo⁄s accrue.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I solve for a symmetric equilibrium of the previous game by backward induc-
tion.
3.1 Pricing game
I ￿rst look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices for a given number of ￿rms n and
given marginal costs fcigi=1;:::;n.13 At date 7, all ￿rms have set their prices. Suppose ￿rm i
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between purchasing from ￿rms i and i + 1 if






























The total demand faced by ￿rm i is just m times x + x0; or







[(pi+1 ￿ pi) + (pi￿1 ￿ pi)]
￿
:
13Remember marginal costs are private information of each ￿rm.
10At date 6, each ￿rm chooses its price to maximize expected pro￿ts ￿i. Firms know their
own realized cost ci and, in equilibrium, every other ￿rm￿ s expected cost E (c) (and thus
expected price E (p)). Therefore, ￿rm i maximizes
￿i = E [(pi ￿ ci)qi]
= (pi ￿ ci)E (qi)







[(E (p) ￿ pi) + (E (p) ￿ pi)]
￿







(E (p) ￿ pi)
￿
: (1)
Di⁄erentiation of (1) with respect to pi leads to




E (p) + ci
2
(2)











+ E (c) (3)
Substituting (3) and (2) in (1) yields the unique Nash equilibrium in prices:14




E (c) + ci
2







(E (c) ￿ ci)
￿2
: (4)
3.2 Project selection and implementation
The agent will choose ei = 1 if and only if




To interpret this, notice that the agent￿ s wage is independent of e⁄ort, that the agent receives
private bene￿ts b when the principal imposes her preferred project (which happens with
14See Raith (2003) for the case of quadratic transport costs.
11probability Ii), and that by exerting e⁄ort the agent receives B instead of 0 when he enjoys
discretion (which happens with probability 1 ￿ Ii), but has to face the cost of e⁄ort  :
The principal￿ s expected payo⁄ when she chooses control e⁄ort Ii and pays wage wi to
her agent is





if the agent gathers information (ei = 1) and





if the agent makes no e⁄ort (ei = 0): With probability Ii; the principal is informed and
can instruct the agent to implement her preferred project, which results in expected pro￿ts
of ￿i (cP;E (c)) from the market game. With the complementary probability, the principal
is uninformed and grants the agent autonomy in decision making ￿the resulting expected
pro￿ts are ￿i (cA;E (c)) when the agent implements his preferred project [cf. (6)], and
￿i (c;E (c)) when the agent is uninformed and implements no project [cf. (7)].
Each principal￿ s problem is to decide the level of discretion to be granted to her agent,
which will in turn induce him to collect information or not. To focus on equilibria in which
all agents gather information, I assume that the agent￿ s e⁄ort is valuable, i.e., that he can
add value through his ￿rm-speci￿c investment.15 A contract (wi;Ii) is then incentive feasible
if it satis￿es the incentive constraint (5) and ensures the agent￿ s participation:
wi + Iib + (1 ￿ Ii)B ￿   ￿ 0 () wi + Iib + (1 ￿ Ii)B ￿  : (8)
The principal therefore maximizes ￿i (wi;Ii) subject to (5), (8), and wi ￿ 0. It is easy to
see that the optimal wage will be equal to 0: It is also straightforward to show that (5) implies
(8) since Iib and wi are nonnegative. Assume for the moment that (5) is not binding, which
will be the case for   low enough and for B high enough. Given expectations E (c) about
15The case in which ei = 0 for all i is solved in the same fashion as with ei = 1, with c replacing cA; and
can be analyzed by checking comparative statics with respect to ￿c (by de￿ning ￿c = c ￿ cP).














Expected costs of rivals in a symmetric equilibrium with informed agents are
E (c) = I ￿ cP + (1 ￿ I) ￿ cA = cA ￿ I ￿ ￿c: (10)
In a symmetric equilibrium, all ￿rms choose the same level of discretion, i.e., Ii = I for all
i: Substituting (10) in (9) and solving for I results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in delegation decisions has each















Remark When, contrary to what we have assumed, (5) is binding, the level of auton-
omy is determined by the incentive compatibility constraint; i.e., 1 ￿ I =
 
B: An implicit
cost of control arises because principals have to choose a level of control that is lower than
the unconstrained optimum in order to keep their agents motivated to show initiative. A
measure of this cost is given by the Lagrange multiplier associated with (5). This ￿shadow
price￿of initiative can be written as
￿ =
4t(n  + B (m￿c ￿ n)) ￿ mn(￿c)
2 (B ￿ 2 )
4bnt
;
and it can be shown that ￿ responds to changes in competition in exactly the same way as I in
(11).16 This is hardly surprising: any increase in competition that calls for reduced autonomy
(or increased control) will make the cost of extracting the agent￿ s e⁄ort more costly when
(5) is binding. For the sake of brevity, we shall focus on the case of a nonbinding incentive
constraint in what follows.
16Proofs are available from the author upon request.
133.3 Entry decision











At date 1, ￿rms enter until (12) equals the entry cost f: With free entry, the equilibrium


















4 Product-market competition and decision-making au-
tonomy
4.1 Exogenous number of ￿rms
Changes in various parameters of the model can be interpreted as an increase in competition.
With an exogenous number of ￿rms, a reduction in market size m or an increase in the
number of ￿rms n result in a less concentrated market ￿which may be construed as a more
competitive market. A reduction in transport costs t (i.e., an increase in substitutability)
reduces prices and pro￿ts, and can also be regarded as a strengthening of competition. By
simply di⁄erentiating (11) with respect to m; n and t; we can assess the impact of these
parameter changes on the equilibrium choice of I ￿which the following two propositions
summarize.
Proposition 2 With an exogenous number of ￿rms, an increase in competition, as measured
by a reduction in market size m or an increase in the number of ￿rms n, leads unambiguously
to an increase in the agent￿ s autonomy 1 ￿ I:






4 > 0; and therefore n￿ > 0:
14The intuition for this result is straightforward. Conditional on the agent exerting e⁄ort,
both a reduction in market size given n; and an increase in the number of ￿rms given m;
simply reduce expected ￿rm output and thus the bene￿t of reducing marginal costs ￿rent
seeking by agents is less costly and principals can a⁄ord a higher level of agent￿ s autonomy.
Evidence of a positive relationship between the number of ￿rms and managerial autonomy
is provided in Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2009).
A market can also be said to be more competitive when transport costs are lower or prod-
uct substitutability is higher. The next proposition summarizes the impact of a reduction
in t on the optimal level of discretion granted to the agent.
Proposition 3 An increase in substitutability (a reduction in t) increases the agent￿ s au-
tonomy (reduces I) in more concentrated markets (i.e., those with m
n > 1
2￿c), but decreases
his discretion in more dispersed markets (where m
n < 1
2￿c).
To build intuition for this result, let us plug (2) in (1) to get








and use it to compute the value ￿ of a cost reduction from cA to cP, which is also the
marginal bene￿t from increased control (that is, the bene￿t of having the principal rather
than the agent decide):












￿ (cA + cP)
￿
: (14)
By Assumption 3, ￿ > 0: hence, a reduction in marginal cost increases expected pro￿ts.




@t ; and can be decomposed in two
separate e⁄ects of di⁄erent sign. The direct e⁄ect is a business-stealing e⁄ect, and thanks to
Assumption 3, @￿
@t < 0. Increased substitutability makes the demand faced by a ￿rm more
elastic, and, for given prices set by its rivals, makes it easier for each ￿rm to steal business
from the others by reducing costs and prices. A reduction in t increases then value of a cost
reduction, and leads each ￿rm to give less discretion to the agent.
15The indirect e⁄ect of a change in t is a strategic e⁄ect. An increase in substitutability
leads to lower equilibrium prices [cf. (3)], and a reduction in E (p) decreases a ￿rm￿ s gain
from reducing its cost. Because the reaction curves are upward sloping, a fall in E (p) implies
a decrease in pi; but a less than proportional one [compare (2) and (3)] ￿therefore, ￿rm i
loses market share and has less to gain from a cost reduction, which points in the direction




When the strategic e⁄ect dominates, an increase in competition reduces the value of a
cost reduction, and the optimal response of the principal is to reduce the probability of
intervention (or increase autonomy) in order to commit to higher expected costs, and thus
higher prices [see (3)]. The principal delegates more to be less aggressive in the market-
place. Hands-o⁄ management (giving subordinates great discretion) is indicative of a soft
competitor.18
Given that the strategic e⁄ect is proportional to market concentration (or expected ￿rm-
level output) m
n, this e⁄ect is more likely to overcome the business-stealing e⁄ect for ￿rms
in more concentrated markets.19 Indeed, as Proposition 3 shows, an increase in competition
through greater product substitutability leads to increased autonomy when m
n > 1
2￿c: On
the other hand, for low values of m
n; the business-stealing e⁄ects dominates, an increase in
competition raises the value of a cost reduction, and the ￿rm grants less discretion to the
agent in order to be more aggressive in pricing.20
A ￿rm can be said to have a centralized decision-making structure if it is likely that
a decision will be made by someone at the top rather than by someone at lower levels of
the hierarchy. According to this de￿nition, Ik > Il implies that ￿rm k is more centralized
than ￿rm l, and conversely, that ￿rm l is more decentralized than ￿rm k: A straightforward
corollary then follows from Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 Larger ￿rms tend to react to increased competition by implementing a more
18See De Bijl (1995) for an opposite result in a Hotelling model in which the agent can choose product
location.
19Hence, the strategic e⁄ect can also be considered a scale e⁄ect (cf. Raith, 2003).
20The same result obtains in the case of quadratic transport costs.
16decentralized decision-making structure, whereas smaller ￿rms tend to become more central-
ized.
In other words, when faced with the same environmental change, larger ￿rms react dif-
ferently than smaller ￿rms: the former delegate more responsibility, whereas the latter cen-
tralize decision making. An increase in substitutability can enhance or diminish the relative
pro￿tability of centralization; the corollary tells us that the latter case is more likely when
scale is larger. A proper test of this prediction (or that of Proposition 3) would require
the inclusion of interaction terms in a regression of delegation on competition. I am aware
of no empirical study that attempts this, but the dynamics of ￿rm organization depicted in
the corollary are broadly consistent with stylized facts presented in Colombo and Delmastro
(1999).21 Unfortunately, the authors do not explore the factors underlying those dynamics.
4.2 Endogenous number of ￿rms
So far, we have taken the number of ￿rms in the market to be exogenous. However, changes
in competition also lead to changes in the number of ￿rms through the free entry and exit
of competitors ￿that is, market structure is endogenous. Knowing already how the degree
of autonomy varies with competition parameters m and t; we can now analyze how the
endogenous number of ￿rms is a⁄ected by them, and also by the entry cost f. Taking
partial derivatives on (13), and using Assumptions 1 and 3 to sign the derivatives, it is










21Marin and Verdier (2008a) interact competition and market size (which for given n, as assumed here,
covaries perfectly with ￿rm output m
n ), and ￿nd that competition fosters delegation in larger markets (and
hence, larger ￿rms).
17As in the previous subsection, the impact of increased competition on the agent￿ s discretion
depends crucially on which parameter change is triggering the increase in competition.
4.2.1 A reduction in the entry cost
A market that has lower entry costs (i.e., smaller f) is more competitive in the sense that
the number of entering ￿rms is larger and prices are lower. It is straightforward to show the
following.
Proposition 4 With an endogenous number of ￿rms, an increase in competition, as mea-
sured by a decrease in the entry cost f; leads unambiguously to an increase in the level of
discretion given to the agent.























2 < 0; thanks to Assumption 3.
Di⁄erentiating (11) with respect to f and n we obtain @I
@f = 0 and @I
@n < 0: Therefore dI
df > 0:
All else equal, very competitive markets, in the sense of low f; are characterized by more
decentralized ￿rms. The intuition behind Proposition 4 is simple: an increase in competition
due to a reduction in entry barriers (lower f) results in a larger number of ￿rms entering
the market and, for a given market size, in lower concentration, which increases the agent￿ s
autonomy (cf. Proposition 2). Supporting evidence is presented in Acemoglu et al. (2007)
and Bloom et al. (2009).22
22Although these authors do not include some measure of entry costs as a regressor, changes in f can be
tied to changes in the Lerner index, which they use as a measure of competition. The e⁄ect of the latter on
delegation documented in both studies is consistent with Proposition 4.
184.2.2 An increase in product substitutability
An increase in substitutability (i.e., a reduction in t) reduces the pro￿t margin and therefore
decreases the number of entering ￿rms ￿perceived possibilities for di⁄erentiation are reduced.
Focusing once again on ￿; the value of a cost reduction, it is straightforward to show that
with an endogenous number of ￿rms there is a third e⁄ect of t on this gain that runs through
the change in the equilibrium number of ￿rms. This change-in-the-number-of-￿rms e⁄ect is
negative and reinforces the business-stealing e⁄ect, making it less likely to have a positive
impact of increased competition on autonomy as compared to the case with an exogenous
number of ￿rms. For a given market size, @n￿
@t > 0 implies that a reduction in t leads to
an increase in market concentration, which pushes in the direction of reduced autonomy
according to Proposition 2. The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 5 An increase in competition, as measured by a reduction in the transport cost
t; is less likely to lead to more agent discretion in the case of an endogenous number of ￿rms
than in the case of an exogenous market structure.
Proof. With an endogenous number of ￿rms n￿ (t); the total e⁄ect of a change in t on
￿ = ￿(t;n￿ (t)) can be decomposed in three separate e⁄ects: a business-stealing e⁄ect, @￿
@t ;
a strategic e⁄ect, @￿
@E(p)
@E(p)













































cA + cP ￿ 2
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2t > 0 from the discussion in subsection 4.1. We have that @￿
@n = ￿m￿c
















2 > 0. Therefore, the third term in
(15) is negative and reinforces the business-stealing e⁄ect, thus proving the result.
Another way to look at this is to consider directly the e⁄ect of changes in t on the













@t > 0 and @I
@n < 0 from the proof of Proposition 4, increased product substi-
tutability calls for reduced agent discretion in ￿rms in dispersed markets (i.e., those with
m
n < 1
2￿c), as in the case with an exogenous number of ￿rms, since in these markets @I
@t < 0.
In concentrated markets, on the other hand, the negative indirect e⁄ect through the equi-
librium number of ￿rms now opposes a positive direct e⁄ect, and the predicted impact of





2 is close to zero, implying that the total e⁄ect is likely to be negative.
Hence,
Proposition 6 Stronger competition, as measured by an increase in product substitutabil-
ity, leads principals to grant less autonomy in markets where the possibilities for product
di⁄erentiation are important.
4.2.3 An increase in market size
A market that is larger is also more competitive in the sense that more ￿rms enter and prices
are lower. The impact of market size on autonomy becomes ambiguous when we allow for
an endogenous number of ￿rms. The direct e⁄ect of m on the probability of intervention
is positive (cf. Proposition 2), but with an endogenous market structure, market size also
a⁄ects I indirectly through the equilibrium number of ￿rms. This second e⁄ect is negative,
and thus the total e⁄ect cannot be signed a priori.
To explore the conditions under which the e⁄ect of changing m is of either sign, recall ￿
[cf. equation (14)], the gain from reducing marginal costs. The following Proposition shows
how it depends on market size, and provides a simple condition under which the e⁄ect of a
larger market size on autonomy can be signed.
Proposition 7 With an endogenous number of ￿rms n￿ (m);:
￿ the total e⁄ect of a change in m on ￿ = ￿(m;n￿ (m)) can be decomposed in two
separate e⁄ects of di⁄erent sign: a cake-size e⁄ect, @￿









@m; increased competition, as measured by an increase in market size,
leads to increased autonomy in larger markets, but to reduced autonomy in smaller
markets.




































































which proves the ￿rst part. To prove the second part, we just need to show that ￿ is a
























@m; which is the condition stated in the Propo-
sition.
In the short run (i.e., with a ￿xed number of ￿rms), only the (direct) cake-size e⁄ect
appears: an increase in market size (the ￿ cake￿ ) increases the gain from reducing costs, and
hence leads to reduced autonomy for the agent (cf. Proposition 2). In the longer run, the
increase in m attracts more ￿rms (the ￿ diners￿ ) to the market, and the consequent increase
in n tends to reduce that gain ￿thus calling for more decentralized decision making (the
number-of-diners e⁄ect). Which e⁄ect will prevail is uncertain, and depends crucially on the
sensitivity of the number of ￿rms to market size.
21Although we cannot exclude a priori cases in which @2n￿
@m2 > 0; economic sense tells us that
@2n￿
@m2 < 0; n￿ should be an increasing and concave function of m: According to Proposition
7, ￿ is a concave function of m provided @2n￿
@m2 is not too negative ￿i.e., provided n￿ is
not too concave. Therefore, under a mild condition on the concavity of n￿ we can be
sure that the indirect, number-of-diners e⁄ect will eventually overturn the cake-size e⁄ect
for m large enough.23 In that case, the model predicts a U-shaped relationship between
competition (market size) and autonomy: decentralized decision-making structures should
be more common in ￿rms both in very small and very large markets. Indirect evidence of a
such nonmonotonic relationship between competition and delegation is presented in Karuna
(2008).
5 Concluding remarks
A central concern for organizational economics and industrial organization lies with the struc-
ture of organizations and the behavior of organizational participants, and particularly with
the need to identify ways in which environmental factors constrain both. Dill (1958) argued
long time ago that the delegation of authority (￿the autonomy of managerial personnel￿ ) is
in￿ uenced by the structure of the ￿rm￿ s environment. For instance, it has been recently sug-
gested that increasing competition in the markets is forcing ￿rms to adopt leaner structures,
delegate authority and responsibility down the hierarchy, empower their employees, and so
on.
Interestingly, the relationship between competition and delegation (or autonomy) has
not received much attention from the theoretical literature, and when it has, the conclusions
have not been clear-cut. This paper has studied how oligopolistic ￿rms optimally respond
to increased competition by adapting their internal organization. It has shown how each







@m holds in the standard formulation of the Salop model. I have




@m2 would seem to indicate that it could violate the condition, but only if ￿c is large. This situation is
likely to lead to a violation of Assumption 3.
22￿rm modi￿es the level of discretion or autonomy in decision making that is granted to
subordinates according to changes in market size, product substitutability, and entry costs
that can be interpreted as an increase in competition. These di⁄erent sources of increased
competition a⁄ect di⁄erently the relative pro￿tability of delegation, thus providing di⁄erent
predictions on the relationship between competition and autonomy. These predictions, in
turn, invite further empirical work ￿which has been of limited scope so far, and has provided
mixed answers to the question of whether competition favors delegation.
By simultaneously addressing ￿the choice of both competitive actions and organizational
design￿(Spulber, 1992), this paper has made an attempt at bringing economic theory and
management strategy closer together. By treating market structure as endogenous, it has
shown that the predictions concerning competition and delegation can be di⁄erent from
the case where market structure is taken as given ￿suggesting in passing that there might
be a di⁄erence in the short- and long-run responses of organizational design to increased
product-market competition.
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